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Could	the	Norway	model	work	for	Britain?	Twelve
points	to	help	you	decide
While	considering	the	EU	Withdrawal	Bill,	the	Lords	passed	an	amendment	to	require	the
Commons	to	vote	on	remaining	in	the	European	Economic	Area,	bringing	the	possibility	of
a	‘Norway	model’	for	the	UK	back	on	the	agenda.	John	Erik	Fossum	and	Hans	Petter
Graver	explain	how	this	works	and	how	it	has	affected	Norway’s	relationship	with	the	EU.
While	Norway	has	rejected	membership	of	the	European	Union	twice	in	referendums	in
1972	and	1994,	it	has	consistently	sought	as	close	a	relationship	with	it	as	is	possible	for	a	non-member.	The	core
element	of	that	relationship	is	the	European	Economic	Area	(EEA)	agreement,	which	came	into	effect	in	January
1994,	and	which	seamlessly	ties	Norway	to	the	EU’s	internal	market	without	it	being	part	of	the	supranational	political
union.
But	Norway’s	experience	shows	how	non-members	must	make	difficult	trade-offs	between	relative	autonomy	in
decision-	and	rule-making	and	access	to	the	EU’s	internal	market	and	other	EU	policies.	Norway	is	frequently
portrayed	as	a	‘rule-taker’	and	there	is	no	doubt	that	its	inability	to	directly	affect	EU	decision-making	is	–
democratically	speaking	–	very	problematic.
Yet	a	closer	look	at	Norway’s	experience	reveals	that,	in	spite	of	this,	members	of	the	EEA	can	still	shape	their	socio-
economic	model	and	mode	of	functioning.	In	other	words,	how	a	country	handles	its	relationship	with	the	EU
matters.	Norway	has	retained	a	well-functioning	welfare	state	and	high	levels	of	trust	in	public	institutions,	helping	to
offset	potential	negative	influences.
This	trust	is	crucial.	Norway’s	experience	underlines	that	the	issue	is	not	simply	one	of	mode	of	EU	affiliation	but	the
important	left/right	issue	of	choice	of	socio-economic	model,	which	has	significant	bearings	on	the	question	of	social
justice.
In	the	following,	we	present	in	more	detail	some	of	the	features	of	the	so-called	Norway	model,	and	in	doing	so	seek
to	debunk	some	of	the	myths	surrounding	it.
1.	The	‘Norway	model’	is	to	some	extent	a	misnomer	since	a	core	aspect	of	what	is	commonly	referred	to	as	the
Norway	model	is,	in	fact,	the	European	Free	Trade	Association	(EFTA)-based	EEA	agreement	which	was	signed	by
Iceland,	Lichtenstein	and	Norway.	All	decisions	here	are	based	on	unanimity.
2.	The	scope	of	affiliation	for	the	three	EFTA	members	of	the	EEA	is	not	identical,	and	the	EEA	does	not	cover
the	entire	internal	market	freedoms	of	the	EU.	Importantly,	Liechtenstein	has	retained	the	right	to	place	quantitative
restrictions	on	the	number	of	new	residents.	In	addition,	free	movement	of	goods	does	not	include	goods	from	third
countries	since	the	EEA	Agreement	is	not	a	customs	union.	This	shows	that	membership	in	the	internal	market	is	not
necessarily	an	“all	or	nothing”	arrangement.
3.	The	‘Norway	model’	is	not	only	the	EEA	but	is	actually	made	up	of	120	different	arrangements	and	covers	a	far
greater	realm	of	issue-areas	than	just	those	regulated	under	the	EEA	agreement.	Norway	is	an	affiliated	member	of
Schengen	and	asylum	and	police	cooperation	(Dublin	I,	II	and	III).	Norway	is	therefore	situated	within	the	EU’s
external	border	with	responsibility	for	border	controls.	It	has	also	signed	agreements	on	foreign	and	security	policy
and	participates	in	the	EU’s	battle	groups.
4.	The	Norway	model	may	not	be	so	much	more	constraining	than	the	Swiss	model	as	the	formal	difference	in
these	modes	of	affiliation	suggests.	The	point	is	that	the	Swiss	unilaterally	adapt	their	legislation	to	be	EU-
compatible.	The	EU	is	unhappy	with	the	Swiss	arrangements,	and	they	will	likely	not	be	extended	elsewhere.
5.	The	sheer	range	of	affiliations	under	the	Norway	Model	testifies	to	some	flexibility	and	ingenuity,	but	there
are	limits,	especially	within	the	EEA	agreement,	which	is	about	common	rules	and	equal	conditions	for	competition.
There	is	political	will	on	both	the	EU	side	and	the	Norwegian	side	to	maintain	close	relations,	and	that	allows	for	a
certain	measure	of	flexibility.
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6.	The	EFTA	states	retained	their	freedom	to	decide	their	own	trade	policies	towards	third	countries	because
they	are	not	part	of	the	EU’s	customs	union.	In	2016,	Norway	had	negotiated	with	the	EFTA	countries	27	free	trade
agreements,	and	negotiations	with	ten	countries	(including	China)	and	regional	trade	blocks	(MERCOSUR).
7.	Norway’s	experience	suggests	that	it	is	far	better	to	have	a	deal	than	not	to	have	one.	Theresa	May	has
said	on	Brexit	that	no	deal	is	better	than	a	bad	deal.	The	Norway	Model,	with	all	its	challenges,	has	shown	to
Norwegians	that	having	common	rules	and	equal	conditions	of	competition,	and	the	equivalent	means	of
enforcement,	offers	the	certainty	that	is	necessary	for	an	open	economy	to	function	in	today’s	tightly	interwoven
Europe.
8.	The	Norway	Model	is	not	much	contested.	In	fact,	there	has	always	been	a	clear	majority	in	Norway	in	support
for	the	model	it	has	adopted:	there	is	both	little	support	for	EU	membership,	and	very	little	support	for	abolishing	the
EEA.	There	is	a	very	strong	sense	across	most	economic	sectors	that	assured	EU	access	is	vital	for	prosperity.	65%
of	Norway’s	exports	(excluding	oil,	gas	and	ships)	go	to	the	EU.
9.	The	importance	of	open	borders.	The	1630	km	long	Norway-Sweden	border	has	been	open	for	200	years.
When	Sweden	entered	the	EU,	Norway	could	only	keep	it	open	through	becoming	affiliated	with	Schengen,	which
meant	that	Norway	would	be	inside	the	EU’s	external	border	with	responsibility	for	border	controls.	Had	Norway
opted	to	stay	outside	of	Schengen	doing	so	would	have	undermined	the	Nordic	Passport	Union	and	free	movement
in	the	Nordic	region.	In	the	UK	context,	the	political	importance	of	maintaining	open	the	Irish	border	is	readily
apparent.	In	both	the	UK	and	Norway,	there	are	political	as	well	as	economic	reasons	for	keeping	open	borders.
10.	Norway	is	a	rule-taker	and	the	‘Norway	model’	is	democratically	problematic.	It	reflects	the	problems	of
balancing	state	sovereignty,	national	democracy	and	assured	EU	access,	and	privileges	the	last	dimension	of
access.	The	Norway	model	reflects	the	complex	nature	of	the	EU,	which	combines	a	supranational	core	(the	internal
market)	and	a	set	of	intergovernmental	arrangements	for	handling	matters	of	border	controls	and	security.	There	is
more	scope	for	bargaining	in	the	intergovernmental	realm,	which	the	UK	has	experienced	through	its	numerous	opt-
outs	and	opt-ins.	The	implication	is	that	the	EU	is	more	likely	to	accept	bespoke	arrangements	in	the
intergovernmental	than	in	the	supranational	institutional	realm	(the	internal	market	and	customs	union).
11.	Norway’s	experience	shows	that	it	is	important	to	consider	the	state’s	ability	to	handle	its	EU
relationship.	The	Norwegian	state	is	a	well-functioning	state	with	a	high	level	of	competence	and	a	broad	range	of
comprehensive	welfare	arrangements	and	measures	to	promote	gender	equality.	These	features	enable	it	to
compensate	actors	for	many	of	the	negative	effects	of	Europeanisation.
12.	Norwegians	will	not	automatically	get	the	same	arrangements	with	Britain	that	members	of	the	EU	will.
Norway	is	not	part	of	the	Brexit	negotiations	and	for	many	issues	Norway	will	have	to	sort	out	its	relations	with	the
UK	on	its	own,	for	example,	on	the	rights	of	Norwegian	citizens	in	the	UK	and	UK	citizens	in	Norway.	In	this	case,	the
UK	government	has	assured	Norway	that	citizens	will	receive	the	same	treatment.	Nevertheless,	Norway	is	a
decision-taker	on	the	sidelines	during	the	negotiations	on	the	UK’s	future	relationship	with	the	EU	and	is	concerned
with	when	its	arrangements	with	the	UK	will	be	settled.
______
Note:	the	above	draws	on	the	authors’	book	on	the	subject,	‘Squaring	the	circle	on	Brexit:	Could	the	Norway	model
work?’,	published	in	2018	by	Policy	Press.
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